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Abstract
Both Europe and the US have set ambitious new goals to improve air transport by simultaneously increasing capacity, reducing cost while
improving an already impressive safety record. This requires integration of the systems of the various actors involved. The virtual enterprise
concept, supported by a network-centric architecture, offers one possible solution. A prototype demonstrates the technical feasibility of
this approach. Work on a certifiable safety-critical Java subset, the language used to implement the prototype, demonstrates the technical
feasibility for each required safety level.
Unfortunately, current software certification standards differ for the various systems involved, imposing different and sometimes even non-
compatible requirements. Based on the certification requirements of the prototyped services the applicable software certification standards
are assessed. Network-centric solutions are based on the extensive use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) products and services. COTS is
predicated on multiple users for a product or service, so the relevance of software certification schemes from other safety-conscious domains
for air transport is reviewed to arrive at recommendations to improve the software certification process.
Without special provisions network-centric systems could lead to a new type of security vulnerability. Two remedial approaches, security
certification and COTS security solutions are discussed below.
 2004 Elsevier SAS. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The European Vision 2020 [1] envisages in 2020 a
threefold increase of air transport because air travel is more
affordable, safer (five fold reduction of accident rate), very
punctual (99% on time) and responsive (halve time-to-
market). The vision explicitly mentions a very efficient air
traffic management system and the need to combine the
effort of all stakeholders e.g. through e-business, one of
the constituents of the virtual enterprise, also referred to as
virtual organisation.
The US Anyone, anything, anywhere, anytime vision
[21] for 2025 states a 90% reduction of the fatal acci-
dent rate, a tripling of the air traffic management capac-
ity and a reduction of the time-to-market from the cur-
rent decades/years to months/weeks. Information technol-
ogy heads the list of breakthrough capabilities required to
E-mail address: kesseler@nlr.nl (E. Kesseler).
1 Tel +31 20 511 3462. Fax +31 20 511 3210.
achieve the ambitious US vision. General domain infor-
mation technology can integrate the systems of the vari-
ous stakeholders involved into a network-centric system-
of-systems, a realisation of the virtual enterprise. Such a
virtual enterprise improves the combined performance of
all stakeholders involved. In various other domains, which
lack air transport’s safety concerns, such improvements have
already been achieved. The Total Information Sharing for
Pilot Situational Awareness Enhanced by Intelligent Sys-
tems (TALIS) project [17], which predates these visions
but shares the cited conclusions, realises a prototype of a
such network-centric architecture. This prototype enables
a virtual organisation for the operational part of air trans-
port. The completed prototype, consisting of the middle-
ware and two sample applications, demonstrates the tech-
nical feasibility of this network-centric approach. Fig. 1 pro-
vides a conceptual overview of network-centric architec-
ture.
The network-centric architecture supports services for all
flight phases. Fig. 1 demonstrates the integration of various
1270-9638/$ – see front matter  2004 Elsevier SAS. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ast.2004.03.002
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Nomenclature
AL Assurance Level
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
AOC Airline Operations Centre
ATM Air Traffic Management
CNS Communication Navigation Surveillance
COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay
System
EUROCONTROL European Organisation for the Safety
of Air Navigation
ESARR EURCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirement
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FHA Functional Hazard Analysis
J2EE Java Enterprise Edition
J2ME Java Micro Edition
J2SE Java Standard Edition
MISRA Motor Industry Software Reliability Association
(P)SSA (Preliminary) System Safety Assessment
SIL Safety Integrity Level
TALIS Total Information Sharing for Pilot Situational
Awareness Enhanced by Intelligent Systems
WAAS Wide Area Augmentation System
Fig. 1. Conceptual overview of the prototyped network-centric architecture.
actors at the airport. This part of the flight requires services
of various safety criticality levels, supporting the need for
harmonisation of the certification standards.
The pilot-oriented sample service of Fig. 2 illustrates the
kind of optimisation that the network-centric architecture
aims to support.
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Fig. 2. Pilot-oriented sample service.
At an airport the pilot information-needs are flight-phase
dependent. A co-ordinated pushback service will allow
the pilot to improve the reliability of on-time pushback.
For this the pilot needs amalgamated information from,
e.g., fuelling services, baggage-handling services, catering
services, security services and Airline Operations Centre
(AOC) about transfer passengers. This pushback service
optimises utilisation of the taxi-way linking the various
gates and prevents aircraft from blocking each other or
ending up in the wrong take-off order. Subsequently taxiing-
services guide the aircraft to the correct runway, optimised
for the other airfield traffic, its departure timeslot and
taking possibly adverse weather or airfield maintenance
restrictions into account. Finally, runway incursion services,
using surveillance services, improve the safety during take-
off.
Fig. 3 shows how the prototyped network-centric archi-
tecture builds upon various COTS components, which in
turn support various hardware platforms, from small mobile
wireless equipment (Java Micro Edition, J2ME) to standard
PC-based hardware with standard communication (Java En-
terprise Edition, J2EE). The services, which provide the ac-
tual value to the users, will run on top of the network-centric
federated architecture. Once a service is connected to the
federated architecture, all other services in the network can
connect to it, either to provide input or use the results.
For the various systems and services depicted in Figs. 1
and 2, diverse certification standards and even different
certification paradigms apply. The prototype and its intended
services are used to focus which software certification
standards to assess. Certifying the same software being
part of several services according to different standards
does not add safety but does impede the affordability and
responsiveness required by the European and US vision
statements.
Aircraft certification includes initial airworthiness certi-
fication of the aircraft type complemented by certification
of each modification and upgrade of the aircraft. In prin-
ciple certification is performed only once for each aircraft
type. Pilots, other relevant airline personnel, aircraft main-
tenance personnel, etc. are certified or licensed for a fixed
period of time. Extensions require re-certification effort. All
certificates are issued and valid nationally, although the Eu-
ropean Union is moving to a single certification for all its
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Fig. 3. Network-centric architecture overview.
member states. US-European harmonisation, which started
in 1992, still has a long way to go to achieve a single certifi-
cate or a full, mutual recognition of the certificates. Depend-
ing on the country involved, these certifications are com-
plemented by certification of the air traffic controllers and
the air traffic management system. To ensure compliance
with internationally recognised minimum safety standards
for aircraft and pilots, international oversight of foreign air-
craft and their pilots is being performed both in Europe and
the United States. Over the years these certification sys-
tems have evolved into a comprehensive set of standards,
rules and regulations, covering all relevant aspects of fly-
ing. However, as the various certification standards evolved
from different backgrounds, they impose non-harmonised
requirements. Components of network-centric systems will
be software based. Relevant certification standards include
DO-178B [4] for aircraft avionics, DO-278 [5] for Commu-
nication, Navigation, Surveillance and Air Traffic Manage-
ment (CNS/ATM) systems, European Organisation for the
Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL)’s Recommen-
dation for Air Navigation Services software [8] and AC120-
76A [9] for the electronic flight bag. Software certification
can take a considerable amount of time and consume signif-
icant resources especially for systems designed without cer-
tification in mind as is demonstrated by the protracted and
problematic Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) cer-
tification.
The realised prototype is based on using COTS and only
adding the air transport specific functions. For most current
software certification standards, use of COTS will exacer-
bate these certification problems. However the success of
any network-centric solution critically depends on a para-
digm shift to using COTS and achieving a short time-to-
market. COTS can also help in achieving safety, as within
the Open Group [20] work has started to produce a Java sub-
set that will be certifiable to the strictest DO-178B level.
The major conclusion of [3] is that certification should
assess the entire system and not be limited to the subsys-
tems involved. Due to the importance of information tech-
nology to fulfill with the European and US visions, this pa-
per will concentrate on software certification. Based on our
own work on software certification, the relevant air transport
practises will be assessed in the next section. Section 3 com-
pares those practices with what is being done in some other
safety-conscious sectors. Some potential security issues and
solutions are addressed in Section 4. The last section arrives
at recommendations on how to improve the current state-of-
the-art to arrive at certifiable safe and secure but also respon-
sive and affordable integrated air transport software.
2. Air transport software certification
2.1. General
All discussed standards share the notion that software
has to be classified according to the system hazards (loss
of life, aircraft damage) the software failure would cause or
contribute to. This information is obtained from the Func-
tional Hazard Analysis (FHA) combined with the (Prelimi-
nary) System Safety Assessment (P)SSA. Based on this in-
formation, the software will be classified. For each software
class a number of standard specific requirements have to be
satisfied. The current information technology state-of-the-art
makes it impossible to assess whether a completed software
product complies with the very low failure rates air transport
requires. Consequently all standards impose requirements on
the processes to make and maintain the software. An inde-
pendent authority, i.e. independent from the supplier, pur-
chaser and user, checks compliance with these process re-
quirements and approves complying products as fit-for-use.
It is important that software certification focuses only
on assuring sufficient confidence in achieving the required
safety level. Safety certification should not interfere with
the many other aspects related to software production, in
order to allow the supplier maximum freedom to achieve
its other organisational goals. Providing freedom on these
other aspects will facilitate innovation and foster competi-
tion. Consequently, worthwhile goals like software improve-
ment or ISO-9000 based quality assurance should be dealt
with otherwise. EUROCONTROL acknowledges this prin-
ciple of separation of concerns by dividing its regulatory
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framework into mandatory rules, mandatory regulations and
non-mandatory practises. For certain subjects these docu-
ments can be complemented by EUROCONTROL speci-
fications, which provide a possible of means compliance,
and guidelines, which provide explanation. The disadvan-
tages of ignoring such separation of concerns are nicely il-
lustrated by work on the EUROCONTROL’s Air Naviga-
tion Services software recommendations (Section 2.4) which
combine software safety and process improvement. After
work started, ISO-12207, which describes the state-of-the-
art in software processes, has been extended to ISO-15504.
ISO-15504 defines 35 primary processes and 38 supporting
and organisational lifecycle processes. ISO-9000 has been
upgraded to ISO-9000: 2000 and the Capability Maturity
Model has been upgraded to CMMIntegrated. All these stan-
dards are useful, but do not directly aim to assure software
safety.
2.2. Airborne software safety standard DO-178B/ED12B
For all software in an aircraft DO-178B applies. As
one of the oldest software safety standards it influenced
other software safety standards. Based on the system level
FAR/JAR AC-25-1309 five software levels are defined
by DO-178B. For convenience in Table 1 the quantified
FAR/JAR failure-probability definition is included.
Detailed requirements are provided for each level. Many
consider DO-178B as the toughest standard in industry.
Fig. 4 provides an overview of the DO-178B software
development and certification processes. DO-178B has an
abstract lifecycle defining four generic phases (software re-
quirement process, software design process, software cod-
ing process and software integration process). A developer
must map its software processes onto those required by DO-
178B. This is described in a special document called the Plan
of Software Aspects of Certification. This document should
be negotiated between the developer and certifying author-
ity prior to actual software development. Subsequently, the
developer needs only to comply with the agreed Plan of Soft-
ware Aspects of Certification.
DO-178B specifies 66 detailed process requirements. For
every level the applicability of each requirements is defined,
with all required for level A.
Industry standards define the functions that must exist
in certain avionics units (e.g. flight management system).
Suppliers can further enhance such units with customer-
based requirements. Consequently, most avionics units are
custom-made, though the mandating of core functionality
provides a basis for reuse, i.e. COTS.
To date, there is usually only one software application as-
signed to a hardware unit. The integrated modular avionics
industry standard will allow several fixed and pre-defined
applications to run on the same hardware unit. This exam-
Table 1
DO-178B/ED12B overview
Level System failure Failure description Failure probability
description
FAR/JAR definition
per flight hour
A Catastrophic failure Aircraft loss and/or fatalities Extremely improbable · · · < 10−9
B Hazardous/severe major Flight crew can not perform their tasks
Serious or fatal injuries to some occupants
Extremely remote 10−9 < · · · < 10−7
C Major failure Workload impairs flight crew efficiency
Occupant discomfort including injuries
Remote 10−7 < · · · < 10−5
D Minor failure Workload within flight crew capabilities
Some inconvenience to occupants
Probable 10−5 < · · ·
E No effect No effect Not applicable –
Fig. 4. Overview of airborne safety standard DO-178B processes.
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ple illustrates how DO-178B trails current real-time and em-
bedded systems development practices where multitasking
is common practise. The first applicant for a new technology
bears the full burden of convincing the certifying authority.
Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products are officially
allowed by DO-178B, however no requirements are waived
for COTS that have been certified to other safety-standards.
Consequently, only COTS products that have been devel-
oped specifically taking all DO-178B requirements into ac-
count can be used. Note that navigation services like Euro-
pean Geostationary Navigation Overlay System (EGNOS)
and the European Galileo effort, all take DO-178B into ac-
count but deviate on details in project specific certifica-
tion documents. The EGNOS software engineering standard
DRD920 [6] contains a Plan of Software Aspects of Cer-
tification stating full compliance with forty DO-178B re-
quirements plus partial compliance for another four. These
deviations are predicated upon cost-benefit analyses. Some
requirements may be more expensive than justified by air
transport’s the relative usage of the EGNOS service. Each
deviation must be shown to the conservative certifying au-
thority not to materially distract from the safety goals of DO-
178B or be met, implying additional certification effort and
consequently increasing the time-to-market and costs.
The safety appeal of air transport for other safety-
conscious markets has led some operating systems vendors
to produce kernels, which together with the application have
successfully passed DO-178B certification. The vendor will
provide all artefacts needed to certify a new application re-
using the same kernel. This reduces the certification effort
to only the new application being developed. All these
kernels allow software of different safety criticality levels
to run concurrently on the same hardware. One product is
compatible with ARINC 653, also referred to as integrated
modular avionics. Such COTS will reduce costs and provide
additional capabilities like multitasking that air transport
alone can not afford.
Certification is required from each nation where an air-
line wants to acquire an aircraft for civil use. Airbus has ob-
tained its initial 13 type certifications over the last 10 years
from the European Joint Aviation Authority, complemented
by another 13 from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) plus 130 from other nations. Boeing obtained
200 additional certificates in the same period, after the initial
FAA certification [11]. Substantial benefits can be accrued
when each nation accepts the certifications of all accredited
ICAO member states. A system of accreditation should en-
sure equal enforcement of the standard in all nations con-
cerned to prevent safety degradation occurring in specific
nations to propagate internationally, the unwanted equiva-
lent of the maritime cheap flag countries. Currently mutual
certification recognition involves a lengthy negotiation be-
tween the two certifying authorities involved, leading to a
bilateral agreement.
Air transport’s good safety record does not repudiate the
claim that DO-178B compliance provides the safety objec-
Table 2
DO-278/ED109 overview
DO-178 level DO-278 Assurance Level COTS service experience
A AL 1 Not allowed
B AL 2 Negotiate with approval authority
C AL 3 One year
AL 4 Six months
D AL 5 Typically not needed
E AL 6 Not applicable
tives. However, catastrophic failures (level A) are fortunately
so rare, that the absence of software-induced catastrophic
failures does not statistically justify DO-178B claims. Like
all other software safety standards, evidence on the necessity
and effectiveness of each of the 66 requirements is lacking.
They are based on a consensus on engineering judgement.
2.3. RTCA/EUROCAE Air Traffic Management standard
DO-278/ED109
For Air Traffic Management (ATM) ground and satel-
lite systems, the RTCA/EUROCAE have produced a new
standard DO-278 by extending DO-178B. Table 2 provides
an overview of the six Assurance Levels (AL) defined in
DO-278. Note that unlike DO-178B, neither a definition of
the assurance levels nor an indication of the allowed failure
probability is provided. DO-278 adds an assurance level by
splitting level C. DO-178B added a level by splitting level II
from it predecessor DO-178A into level B and C. Conse-
quently any software safety standards should provide suffi-
cient grading.
In contrast to DO-178B, DO-278 acknowledges the
use of independently developed (pre-existing) COTS, by
defining processes for planning, acquisition, verification,
configuration management and quality assurance. It must
be demonstrated that unused COTS capabilities do not
adversely effect the ATM system. An important extension
to DO-178B is that COTS service experience may be used,
thereby obviating the need to apply a DO-278 compliant
development process for some assurance levels. However,
the restrictions on service experience are quite severe. The
information on service experience is included in Table 2.
In the table, “one year” means that for a continuous period
of 8760 hours of representative use no failure may occur.
Additionally, all in-service reports originating from all users
of the COTS have to be evaluated for their potential adverse
effects on the ATM system.
2.4. EUROCONTROL Air Navigation Services standard
EUROCONTROL has produced Recommendations for
Air Navigation Services Software which are an elaboration
of Software in ATM Systems, EUROCONTROL Safety
Regulatory Requirement ESARR6. ESARR6 is currently
subject to a formal approval process and consequently not
yet publicly available. Its software safety classification is
-9-
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Table 3
EUROCONTROL Air Navigation Services software recommendations overview
ANS software
assurance level
ESARR4 severity
(class, effect)
ESARR4 likelihood of
occurrence
Software likelihood of occurrence
(per operational-hour)
1A 1 Accidents Improbable N/A
1B DO-178B level B N/A DO-178B Extremely Remote
10−9 < · · · < 10−7
2 2 Serious incidents Remote 10−6 < · · · < 10−5
3 3 Major incidents Occasional 10−5 < · · · < 10−4
4 4 Significant incidents Probable 10−4 < · · · < 10−3
5 5 No immediate effect on safety N/A N/A
based on the ESARR4 [7]. This standard combines DO-
178B, IEC-61508, and the capability maturity model into
a combined safety and quality assurance document. The
software classification provided in Table 3 is based on
ESARR4, while inserting an additional level identical to
level B of DO-178B. The requirements on the evidence that
needs to be provided depend on the assurance level.
Useful innovations are guidance for contracting software,
both for acquisition and for supply plus guidance for opera-
tions and maintenance. Guidance for COTS is provided. For
assurance levels 1A and 1B COTS is not allowed.
2.5. Electronic flight bag AC120-76A
The electronic flight bag is a COTS-based hardware plat-
form that supports many independent software applications,
even simultaneously. As such the electronic flight bag is well
suited for the airborne part of network-centric solutions. The
electronic flight bag can be part of the aircraft and so DO-
178B applies. However, it can also be used outside the air-
craft, so a special document on the safety and certification
AC120-76A is available. The electronic flight bag could ei-
ther be a portable device like a slate laptop or personal digital
assistant, or be installed in the aircraft.
The electronic flight bag software is classified as:
• Type A: applications that include pre-composed, fixed
presentations of aviation data. Type A software needs
Flight Standards District Office approval. 71 example
applications are provided.
• Type B: applications that include dynamic applications
that interactively manipulate and present aviation data.
Type B software additionally needs evaluation by the
Aircraft Evaluation Group. AC120-76A lists 17 appli-
cations. A six-month operational evaluation is needed,
during which a (paper) back up of the application is re-
quired.
• Type C: all other applications. Full DO-178B approval
is needed.
All user-modifiable software is type C. Consequently a
key requirement of network-centric solutions like dynami-
cally uploading applications remains cumbersome. Positive
is the guidance provided on usability and on human factors.
Compliance to AC120-76A implies compliance to 103
sections of 5 parts of the US Code of Federal Regulation
relating to airworthiness plus 45 additional sections of 4
parts of the operating regulations plus 20 advisory circulars
plus 10 other FAA regulations. Even within AC120-76A,
some parts relate to activities performed only once for the
approval of software, while other parts mention an opera-
tional approval valid for a specific operator for six months.
This profusion of standards, regulations, etc., is typical for
network-centric integrated systems. [21] bluntly states that
current certifications processes can not handle the integrated
software based systems which are needed to fulfill its vi-
sion. However neither research nor experience supports their
proposed shift from product certification at subsystem level
to process certification at system level. As observed by [3],
even the current, more limited, delegation of certification re-
sponsibility to suppliers, through the designated engineering
representative, resulted in (occasional) approval of deficient
or non-complying products. A better option could be to im-
prove various existing data reporting mechanisms to obtain
evidence on the effectiveness of the software-safety require-
ments, which is statistically feasible for the lower critical-
ity levels. Consequently, there is a need for a different ap-
proach to certification, which ensures the safety, but omits
the many not harmonised standards. Note that possible dif-
ferent national interpretations of certification requirements
complicate certification without increasing safety.
3. Other domain safety standards
The following overview from software safety standards
from other domains is provided:
• To learn from their approach. Consequently this chapter
will focus on the differences.
• To assess COTS. For COTS to be viable the air transport
market is too small. Both Boeing and Airbus only
produce a few hundred aircraft per year, with the number
of processors involved in safety critical tasks in the tens
per aircraft. The annual number of new ATM systems is
much smaller. Consequently, COTS products should be
deployable in other safety-conscious markets as well.
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Table 4
IEC-61508 Safety Integrity Levels overview
SIL Failure probability per hour
(systems active > once per year)
Failure probability per demand
(systems active < once per year)
4 10−9  · · · < 10−8 10−5  · · · < 10−4
3 10−8  · · · < 10−7 10−4  · · · < 10−3
2 10−7  · · · < 10−6 10−3  · · · < 10−2
1 10−6  · · · < 10−5 10−2  · · · < 10−1
3.1. Process industry IEC-61508
From the general software safety-critical domain [14]
is available which originated in the process industry. Four
Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) are defined. IEC-61508 states
that only for hardware, safety can be quantified and assessed
using reliability prediction techniques. For software, only
qualitative techniques and judgements are possible. The
Standard explicitly states that failures rates lower then 10−9
per hour (i.e., level A according to DO-178B or DO-278
AL1) can not be achieved for software. IEC-61508 defines
its own software safety lifecycle, based on the V-model. The
lifecycle includes operations, maintenance, repair, retrofit
and even decommissioning procedures, an extension to DO-
178B. The railway industry is converting to IEC-61508 by
providing domain specific extensions to IEC-61508, in line
with the intention of this standard.
Part 7 of the Standard aims to provide an exhaustive list
of techniques for each process phase, including recommen-
dations on their use (or avoidance) for each SIL. This part of
the standard will need regular updates to remain in-line with
information technology innovations. In accordance with the
general IEC practise the first update is due in 2006. It is
possible to certify COTS for a certain level, when an IEC-
61508 compliant development process is followed. An inde-
pendent party will perform the certification. Table 4 provides
an overview of the four SIL levels.
Using service experience is allowed, but in practice
hardly possible for higher SIL levels. An example from the
standard states that for a SIL 1 system, 95% confidence in
correct functioning requires 300 hours of relevant service
experience. For a SIL 4 system, 99.5% confidence requires
690 000 years of service experience.
3.2. Nuclear industry IEC-60880-2
In the nuclear industry IEC-60880-2 [12] is applicable.
IEC-60880 is based on the software classification provided
in IEC-61226 [13], see Table 5. This industry’s basic single-
failure criterion requires the assembly of safety systems to
remain functional despite any random failure. This single-
failure criterion is not applicable for software, as a software
failure can cause a system with multiple hardware units to
fail. As a consequence IEC-60880 devotes an appendix to
the pros and cons of multiple diverse software implementa-
tions. Multiple diverse software versions only provide pro-
Table 5
IEC-61226 overview
Category Description Excerpt assignment criteria
A Principal role
in achieving
safety
• Mitigate to prevent significant sequence
• Failure could result in significant sequence
B Complemen-
tary role to
category A
• Control process variables within safety limits
• Alert staff of category A failure
• Continuously monitor category A function
C Auxiliary or
indirect role
• Enhance category A performance
• Monitor and mitigate internal hazards and
natural events
• Ensure personnel safety
Unclassified No direct
safety role
• Not significant to safety
tection against some fault classes, so incorrect or ambiguous
specifications remain a single point-of-failure.
IEC-60880-2 distinguishes between software tools that
can introduce errors and tools that fail to detect them. The
requirements for the former category are strict. Compilers
(called translators) are acknowledged to be too large to
demonstrate their correctness. They are trusted under certain
restrictions, unlike DO-178B where binary code needs to
be verified for the highest level. The compiler may not
introduce dead code, which is code that is not traceable
to requirements (e.g., error handling). Operating experience
may compensate for some lack of design documentation.
IEC-60880-2 allows COTS. There are strict requirements
on the evaluation of functions, design documentation etc. In
case operating experience is used, there are requirements on
the operating history data. Like DO-278 after acceptance of
the COTS, all subsequent error and failure information from
all users has to be assessed for its potential impact on the
approved system.
Formal methods can prove with mathematical rigour that
an implementation conforms to its specification. Each of
the wide range of formal methods seems to work best for
certain specific applications. Unfortunately formal methods
in general do not yet scale well to applications with the size
of actual safety critical applications. For tractable systems
formal methods have shown to provide benefits. For instance
70% of the A340 flight control computer software can be
generated using a specific formal method plus automatic
code generation tool [2]. This application is of the highest
criticality level. Unlike DO-178B, the evidence provided by
formal methods, where available, is deservedly recognised
by IEC-60880-2.
3.3. Medical industry FDA-1252
For software in medical devices in the USA [10] applies.
The software is classified into three “levels of concern”,
see Table 6. FDA-1252 states that as the probability of
software failure cannot be measured, only the severity of
the software failure consequences is used to determine the
level of concern. A table listing 12 documents describes for
-11-
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Table 6
FDA-1252 Level of concern
Level of concern Severity description
Major Software failures that could cause, directly or indirectly,
to death or serious injury of the patient and/or the
operator
Moderate Software failures that could cause, directly or indirectly,
to non-serious injury of the patient and/or the operator
Minor Software failures are not expected to cause injury to
patient and/or operator
Table 7
MISRA overview
Controllability
category
Acceptable failure rate Occurrences
per year
Integrity level
Uncontrollable Extremely improbable 10−3 4
Difficult to control Very remote 10−2 3
Debilitating Remote 10−1 2
Distracting Unlikely 1 1
Nuisance only Reasonably possible 10 0
each level of concern what type of information is needed, if
any. No specific software life-cycle model is prescribed, but
a general V-model for verification is provided. Verification
needs to be performed at module, integration and system
levels.
Even though FDA-1252 states that artificial neural net-
works are impossible to verify, they are allowed for all levels
of concern. Consequently the assumptions and the training
of the neural network need to be verified, but no guidance is
provided.
According to FDA-1252, embedded and real-time sys-
tems pose unique concerns. The use of techniques, simula-
tors and emulators to analyse timing of critical events is only
mentioned, but not imposed. The importance of human fac-
tors is acknowledged without enforcing verification and val-
idation requirements. In the same spirit, security is raised,
but no requirements ensue. Consequently the air transport
domain can not learn much from FDA-1252. However, in or-
der for COTS to become commercially viable, COTS needs
to be deployable in various safety critical domains. This im-
plies recognition of DO-178B by the medical domain and a
scaling of its levels to the FDA-1252 levels of concern.
3.4. Automotive industry, MISRA report 2
The Motor Industry Software Reliability Association
(MISRA) has a very practical approach to software integrity
in [18]. The document contains an informative example
to determine the software integrity. Table 7 contains their
classification and an indicative occurrence level.
For integrity level 4 MISRA recommends the use of for-
mal methods complemented with automatic code generation,
although with current technology this is not possible. The
use of a certified compiler of a language with formal seman-
tics is recommended. Until they become available, like DO-
178B, it has to be shown that the machine code reflects the
high-level language version. The assessor needs unimpeded
access to all software development information, something
implicitly assumed by DO-178B.
3.5. ISO 15026 software integrity levels
The ISO 15026 [15] standard combines a threat-identifi-
cation with a frequency analysis and a consequence analysis
to determine the software integrity level. The occurrence
frequency varies between probable, which means 1 to 10−1
occurrences per year and incredible with less then 10−6
occurrences per year, which is low with respect to other
standards. The severity of consequence has four grades
from catastrophic via major and severe to minor. Using
the ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practical) principle
four software integrity levels are determined, A (high), B
(intermediate), C (low) and D (trivial). The methods and
checks to achieve sufficient confidence for the allocated
software integrity level are outside the scope of the standard.
Such methods and checks have to be agreed upon on
a national, sector specific or project specific basis. The
advantage of the minimalist approach is that it is more likely
to remain stable over the years and that it is well suited
for many application domains. The disadvantage is that
additional standards or guidance are needed to determine
the amount of confidence in achieving the software integrity
level.
4. Security
4.1. General
After the tragic September 11 (2001) events new security
threats have become a major concern for air transport. At the
moment only a very limited number of computer networks
is used in those parts of the air transport system which
have safety concerns. Humans using voice links do most
communication. Currently air transport specific proprietary
technology is used, which provides a level of protection
against the ubiquitous hackers that unfortunately roam the
general domain. Especially open COTS-based network-
centric systems, like the realised prototype, are vulnerable
to this type of attack, which is new to air transport, hence
protection is needed. The trend to network-enable systems
will also become relevant for the safety-critical systems
in the other safety-conscious domains. This implies that
standards are not only needed for safety but could also be
used to ensure security. The disadvantage of adding security
functions to each networked service is a proliferation of
potentially un-harmonised security services.
Another approach is to deploy security middleware and
rely on general domain COTS to provide and maintain
a sufficient level of security. The resulting separation of
concerns allows resources to be concentrated on solving air
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transport specific issues. An example of each approach is
described below.
4.2. ISO-15408
ISO-15408 [16] is an international standard that includes
security requirements and can provide certifications for
complying products. ISO-15408 is the civil variant of the
Common Criteria from the military domain and will follow
all updates of the military Common Criteria.
ISO-15408 provides objective evidence about the product
security level. Qualified and officially recognised assessors
perform the objective and repeatable evaluation, much like
DO-178B for safety certification. The evaluation can lead
to a certificate, which is currently recognised by 8 countries
plus all (15) European Union countries.
The ISO-15408 considers three security objectives aim-
ing to prevent:
• Damaging disclosure of the service to unauthorised
recipients (loss of confidentiality).
• Damage through unauthorised modification (loss of
integrity).
• Damage through unauthorised deprivation of access to
the asset (loss of availability).
Fig. 5 provides an overview of the ISO-15408 view on
the realisation of security functions. The security environ-
ment provides the context of the asset. Combined with the
perceived threats and the security policy the security re-
quirements can be derived. These requirements consist of
a reusable Protection Profile and an asset specific Security
Target. Based on these requirements and the extensive list-
ing of possible security functions in the ISO-15408 Part 2,
the security functions of the system are determined. Sepa-
rately the protection level is determined, which determines
the amount of implementation effort and evaluation effort.
Table 8 provides an overview of the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL’s). The amount of COTS products and reusable
protection profiles in the register at the time of writing (Jan-
uary 2004) illustrates that ISO-15408 is rapidly being ac-
cepted. Note that if a product fully complies with the EAL
requirements but additionally is certified to comply with
some requirements of the next higher EAL this can be de-
noted by N+ in the certificate and consequently in Table 8
which is based on the register.
ISO-15408 adds further requirements on the software de-
velopment process, which are based on consensus of engi-
neering judgement. Harmonisation with the safety require-
ments is advantageous.
Note that whereas DO-178B unjustifiably does not recog-
nise the verification evidence from formal methods, ISO-
15408 requires it for the highest level. As air transport does
not have a tradition in software security certification, the in-
dustry can benefit of the military and commercial domains
through this more advanced standard.
4.3. Security middleware
The disadvantage of ISO-15408 is that every application
or service needs to implement the security requirements it-
self. As all intended services are network-enabled, it is pos-
sible to deploy security middleware, just like the realised
prototype deploys network-centric middleware. Such secu-
rity middleware takes care of the authentication, an impor-
tant security aspect. Once a user is authenticated, person-
alised access to all authorised services can be granted e.g.
only the fuelling-service for the fuelling personnel and many
services for the pilot in Fig. 1. The advantage of a middle-
ware solution is that the services themselves do not need to
implement the security. Suitable middleware, e.g. A-Select
[19], allows using various authentication mechanisms con-
currently and transparently like a light authentication for the
fuelling personnel with a strong authentication for the pi-
lot. Middleware facilitates a quick deployment with exist-
ing, low strength mechanisms, with an option to upgrade to
Fig. 5. Overview of ISO-15408 security standard.
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Table 8
ISO-15408 Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL Description # of COTS products # of protection profiles
Certified In evaluation Certified In evaluation
1 Functionally tested, 10 0 0 0
security threats not serious 1+ 1
2 Structurally tested, 18 39 1 7
low to moderate assurance 2+ 9 4
3 Methodically tested and checked, 14 11 4 4
maximum assurance without infringing sound development practise 3+ 3 6
4 Methodically designed, tested and reviewed, 30 4 8 3
maximum assurance compatible with good commercial practise 4+ 13 7
5 Semiformally designed and tested, 0 0 0 1
maximum assurance with moderate security engineering 5+ 1
6 Semiformally verified design and tested, 0 0 0 0
protect high value assets against significant risk
7 Formally verified design and tested, 0 1 0 0
extremely high risk situations and/or high assets values
Total # of COTS products 95 34 13 15
stronger certified mechanisms once they become available.
The ability to use COTS security functions for requirements
that were not included in the original demonstrator shows the
benefits accrued from using the realised open architecture.
5. Conclusions
The European and US visions for air transport require in-
tegration of the systems of the various actors involved. Pro-
totypes based on the deployment of COTS, like TALIS, show
that such integration can be achieved. Current work on certi-
fiable Java will technically allow compliance with the most
stringent safety requirements. However, current air transport
certification standards and practises, like DO-178B, do not
recognise any certification evidence which is gathered out-
side the rigorous air transport certification schemes. Cur-
rent certification schemes are based on strict process re-
quirements, without scientific or empirical backing. For soft-
ware this has led to a profusion of standards with differ-
ent or sometimes even non-compatible requirements. Con-
sequently, it is difficult to recognise certification evidence
from other domains. Those differences are hard to justify,
as they derive from common safety concerns. No standard
is clearly superior. For integrated systems that have to rely
on COTS, like service-driven network-centric solutions, the
current certification practise is hampering key requirements
like responsiveness and affordability hence improvement is
needed.
To improve the following attributes are recommended
for inclusion in software safety standards and certification
schemes:
• Certification by an independent third party.
• Trusted party or organisation must accredit the indepen-
dent third party, yielding international recognition.
• Certification in accordance with objective standards.
• Objective guidance for the reviewers (e.g. like for DO-
178B and ISO-15408).
• Maximum freedom for the software processes being
used and the techniques being deployed in order to
exploit information technology innovation.
• Grading of software with sufficient nuances for less
safety critical applications.
• Data gathering to substantiate the existing software-
safety requirements or modify them to effective require-
ments.
• Recognise the safety evidence of COTS products in
a timely and cost effective manner, to preserve the
advantages of deploying COTS.
• Mutual recognition of the various standards/certificates
to facilitate re-use from safety-conscious domains like
medical, nuclear, railway, process and automotive indus-
try.
• The current state-of-the-art does not (yet) allow large
systems (as used in air transport) to be formally verified.
For tractable subsystems, the evidence provided by
formal methods should be recognised.
• Small, focused scope, which facilitates re-use and im-
proves responsiveness to changes in the continuously
evolving information technology.
• Software standards covering various non related proper-
ties, like safety and security, should impose compatible
requirements on the software lifecycle.
Research is needed on the effect of software safety
requirements so each requirement can be justified for the
intended safety level. Standard innovations like the goal-
based approach, which states the objective, the evidence
and the reasoning are beneficial. It may comply with the
objective of the US aerospace committee to shift to a new
software certification paradigm.
-14-
NLR-TP-2004-255
Security middleware separates authentication from the
applications, facilitating a quick and affordable way to
introduce security in air transport.
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